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INSURANCE
W. Shelby McKenzie*
DiRECT ACTION
In Esteve v. Allstate Insurance Co.,' the Louisiana Su-
preme Court considered whether a direct action could be main-
tained against an insurer qualified to do business in Louisiana
when the policy involved had not been issued or delivered in
Louisiana and the accident had not occurred in Louisiana. The
plaintiff, who was injured in a Florida accident, brought suit
in Louisiana against Allstate, alleging that Allstate was liable
for the negligence of its Florida insured. The majority opinion
by Justice Marcus emphasized that the issue was not whether
Louisiana courts had jurisdiction over Allstate,2 but whether
the right of action against Allstate was authorized under the
Louisiana direct action statute.3 Relying on its earlier analysis
in Webb v. Zurich Insurance Co.,' the court concluded that the
direct action statute was applicable to accidents in which (1)
the policy was issued or delivered in Louisiana, or (2) the acci-
dent occurred in Louisiana. Since the Esteve accident met nei-
ther of these tests, the majority concluded that the plaintiff
could not maintain a direct action against Allstate.
Justice Tate, joined by Justices Calogero and Dennis, con-
curred and suggested that the direct action could be main-
Special Lecturer in Law, Louisiana State University; Member, Baton Rouge
Bar.
1. 351 So. 2d 117 (La. 1977).
2. In connection with its qualification to do business in Louisiana, Allstate was
required to appoint the Secretary of State as its agent for service of "all lawful process
in any action or proceeding against such insurer." LA. R.S. 22:985 (1950).
3. 351 So. 2d at 118 n.3. See LA. R.S. 22:655 (Supp. 1962).
4. 251 La. 558, 205 So. 2d 398 (1967).
5. The plaintiff had also sued her host driver and her insurer, Maryland Casualty
Company. Maryland was subject to a direct action since its policy had been delivered
in Louisiana. However, Maryland's third party demand against Allstate for contribu-
tion met with the same fate as the plaintiffs suit. See also Morse v. Hartford Cas. Ins.
Co., 301 So. 2d 741 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974) and 326 So. 2d 390 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
Attempts to circumvent the limitations of the direct action statute through use of
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction have also been unsuccessful. Kirchman v. Mikuka, 258 So.
2d 701 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
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tained in Louisiana if such action was authorized by either
Louisiana or Florida law. Therefore, even if the Louisiana di-
rect action statute did not authorize such a suit, there was no
constitutional bar to Louisiana's enforcing a claim authorized
by Florida law against a defendant who does business in Loui-
siana, even though the cause of action arose elsewhere. How-
ever, the concurring justices determined that Florida permit-
ted joinder of the insurer only if joined as a co-defendant with
its insured.' Since the insured was not a party to the Esteve
suit, these justices concurred in the dismissal of the action
against Allstate.'
LIABILITY INSURANCE-SETTLEMENT OF MULTIPLE CLAIMS
When multiple claimants are faced with inadequate policy
limits, is each injured party entitled to a proportionate share
of the policy limits according to the extent of his damages?
This issue was presented to the Louisiana Supreme Court in
Holtzclaw v. Falco, Inc.,' a case in which the insurer had ex-
hausted its policy limits in settlement of other claims, leaving
nothing for the plaintiff. On original hearing, the court held
that the direct action statute granted to each injured party a
right to a proportionate share of the policy limits which could
not be prejudiced by the insurer's settlements with other claim-
ants, expressly overruling its earlier decision in Richard v.
Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co.' However, on
rehearing with two dissents, the court reinstated the Richard
rule that the insurer may enter into reasonable and good faith
settlements to be credited against its policy limits even though
such settlements diminish or exhaust the insurance available
to other claimants. Noting that the policy expressly gives the
insurer the right to settle, the court further recognized the ju-
risprudential development of a duty on the part of the insurer
to utilize this settlement right in good faith and with reason-
6. For this proposition the court relied on Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713
(Fla. 1969). See also FLA. STAT. § 627.7262 (1976).
7. Justice Dixon dissented.
8. 355 So. 2d 1279 (La. 1978).
9. 254 La. 429, 223 So. 2d 858 (1969).
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able care and skill for the protection of the interests of both
the insured and the insurer. The court correctly concluded that
this duty to protect its insured through settlement could not be
reconciled with an additional duty to avoid preference among
claimants.
On rehearing, the court held that the provisions of the
direct action statute do not subordinate the insurer's right to
settle to the claimant's right of action. The statute expressly
provides that the action shall be "within the terms and limits
of the policy," which terms include the express right to settle.
The court further held that there is no language in the direct
action statute which grants to an injured person ownership of
or privilege upon a pro rata share of the insurance proceeds.
Therefore, the insurer, acting reasonably and in good faith, can
enter into settlements for the protection of its insured which
may be credited in full against its policy limits.
The holding on original hearing and that suggested by the
dissent, which would penalize the insurer with exposure be-
yond its policy limits for disproportionate settlements, is nei-
ther workable nor required by the direct action statute.0 In the
10. A guaranteed share of the settlement proceeds would effectively eliminate in
many instances the insurer's ability to negotiate the release of its insured from multiple
exposures beyond the policy limits. In addition, the inability to determine the "share"
of each claimant would preclude settlement with fewer than all claimants, since a
mistake in evaluation would expose the insurer to judgment in excess of its policy
limits. There are as many variations of theme as there are accidents resulting in
exposure beyond the policy limits. However, for one example, suppose A was the driver
and B and C were guest passengers in an automobile involved in an accident at an
uncontrolled intersection with an automobile driven by D. A had the statutory right
of way, but there is a serious issue whether his speed and inattention were contributing
causes of the accident. D has automobile liability insurance with a single limit of
$25,000 applicable to the accident. A's claim has a judgment value of $25,000, which
may be defeated by his contributory negligence. B's claim is worth $25,000. The cause
of C's disabling condition is in dispute, and his claim may have a judgment value of
as little as $15,000 or as much as $30,000. Without a definitive judgment, how could
the insurer determine the proportionate share of each claimant? If he were guaranteed
a proportionate share, B would have little incentive to participate in a settlement with
A and C unless he received the lion's share of the proceeds. However, if all claims could
not be settled, it would clearly reduce the insured's excess exposure to settle any two
of the claims, even if such settlements exhausted the policy limits. More importantly,
this right to settle with fewer than all claimants usually gives the insurer the necessary
leverage to negotiate settlement with all claimants. Most importantly, the clearly
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absence of a definitive judgment with respect to each claim, it
would be virtually impossible for an insurer to determine the
proportionate disposition of the policy proceeds. On the other
hand, litigation of all such claims is not only undesirable, but
also deprives the insured of protection through settlement from
multiple claims in excess of his policy limits. The holdings of
Richard and Holtzclaw do place an injured party in jeopardy
that his ultimate recovery may be diminished or precluded by
settlements with other injured parties, but hopefully the recog-
nition of this risk will result in a spirit of cooperation among
claimants which will result in settlements that are in the best
interests of the claimants, the insured and the judicial system.
The jurisprudence imposes the duty on the insurer to act
reasonably and in good faith. However, the scope of this duty
has not been defined in the very few cases in which settlements
have been challenged." The burden of proof is upon the party
attacking the reasonableness or good faith of the settlement. In
Holtzclaw the insurer had communicated with all potential
claimants, asking them to submit their claims by a certain
date. The plaintiff did not submit a claim for consideration
within the deadline and therefore was not included in the set-
tlement negotiated with the other claimants for the available
policy limits. The supreme court held that the insurer had not
acted unreasonably or without good faith "with respect to
Holtzclaw."12
Does this analysis suggest responsibility on the part of the
insurer to communicate with all claimants to afford them an
opportunity to participate in the settlement? Because the issue
can arise in so many varied factual situations, such a duty is
not desirable. Cases will involve varying degrees of exposure
beyond the policy limits, liability may be clear or disputed with
respect to certain claimants or all claimants, and the amount
of damages may be mutually agreed upon or strongly contested
inconsistent duties to protect the insured from excess exposure through settlement and
to prorate the policy limits cannot reasonably be imposed on the insurer.
11. See Louisiana Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
348 So. 2d 1311 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977); Jack v. Jack, 240 So. 2d 435 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1970). See also Wright v. Romano, 279 So. 2d 735 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
12. 355 So. 2d at 1287.
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as to certain or all of them. The reasonableness and good faith
of the insurer should be judged solely in light of the insurer's
duty recognized in Richard and Holtzclaw to use settlement for
the protection of its insured-that is, to minimize as much as
possible the exposure of the insured to liability beyond the
policy limits. To accomplish this purpose, it may be to the
insured's advantage either to exclude intentionally from settle-
ment small or disputed claims if the major or indefensible
claims can be settled or to settle some claims quickly even
though all claimants have not been contacted. The duty of
reasonableness and good faith should be used only to preclude
either fraudulent depletion of the policy limits or settlements
so grossly excessive as to unreasonably prejudice both the in-
sured and injured party.
UNINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE-SETTLEMENT OF MULTIPLE
CLAIMS
Manieri v. Horace Mann Mutual Insurance Co."3 consid-
ered whether an uninsured motorist carrier, faced with multi-
ple claims in excess of its policy limits, was required to prorate
the coverage among its insureds. The policy covered bodily
injury to three persons involved in an automobile accident, two
who were killed and the plaintiff who was injured. The insurer
settled with the survivors of the deceased victims for $4,250
each and offered the remaining $1,500 to the plaintiff. The
plaintiff contended that he was entitled to a larger share of the
policy limits. The court of appeal correctly observed that the
rationale of Richard and Holtzclaw, discussed above, was not
applicable to uninsured motorist claims, because this coverage
does not involve any duty to protect the insured from excess
exposure through settlement. The coverage is for bodily injury
damages which insureds are legally entitled to recover from an
uninsured or underinsured motorist.' The court in Manieri
expressed grave concern over whether the insurer should be
able to favor one insured over another through settlement, but
found in favor of the insurer on the ground that the settlements
13. 350 So. 2d 1247 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1977).
14. See LA. R.S. 22:1406(D) (Supp. 1977).
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achieved substantial proration of the policy limits.
It seems inherently fair that all insureds should share pro-
portionately when uninsured motorist limits are inadequate to
fully compensate all insureds. However, such claims seldom
can be computed with mathematical precision since they in-
volve the difficult determination of damages for personal injury
and wrongful death. In addition, coverage is based upon the
legal liability of a third party which may well be a contested
issue as to one or more insureds. Perhaps, without deciding the
issue, Manieri offers the best solution. A rule which makes
settlement precarious to the insurer is not desirable either for
the insureds who want no impediment to the prompt process-
ing of their claims or for judicial efficiency. Manieri suggests
that the insurer has a duty to consider the interests of all its
insureds, but the insurer has the discretion to decide upon and
implement a reasonable distribution of the proceeds which
achieves substantial proration. Since the issues of coverage,
liability and damages can be disputed and most complicated,
the insurer must be given wide discretion to determine each
insured's fair share in order to encourage voluntary resolution
of multiple claims.
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